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Roundtable
The Skeptical Forsythe: Peace, Human Rights,
and Realpolitik
RHODA E. HOWARD-HASSMANN
During David Forsythe’s long and extremely distinguished career of research on human
rights, he has contributed to many debates, such as on the right to development (Forsythe
1989) and the place of economic, social, and cultural rights in foreign policy (Forsythe and
Heinze 2006). Here, I would like to focus on his analysis of the contradictory relationships
among human rights, justice, and peace. In so doing, I particularly want to pay tribute to
David’s intellectual rigor and skepticism. Whatever his personal ideals, he has always asked
hard questions about the costs of implementing human rights.
For all that we write about the theory of human rights and for all that as scholars we
are committed to them, human rights are difficult to protect. Particularly difficult is the
question of whether, how, and when rights-protective democracies ought to intervene to
protect the human rights of citizens of other countries. In international relations, peace
frequently trumps human rights. Furthermore, no matter how internally democratic they
may be, states willingly ignore human rights in favor of other values.
David describes himself as a “pragmatic liberal” (Forsythe 2006: 262). He is pragmatic
because he realizes the impact of realpolitik on the likelihood that human rights will be a
central concern of international relations. David has always been a close observer of US
foreign policy, characterized by much rhetoric favorable to human rights but much action
contrary to it. In his book on US abuse of post 9/11 prisoners (Forsythe 2011b), David shows
how even the Obama administration, for which many in the human rights community had
had very high hopes, has reneged on its promises to respect international human rights and
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humanitarian law. Partly because of his close observation of US foreign policy, David has
also been skeptical of the proposition that democracies do not make war on each other. In
his Human Rights and Peace, he noted that the United States overthrew the democratically
elected governments of Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. Both, he said, were at least
partial democracies. “Thus we need to pay closer attention to the intriguing question of
covert war by democracies against democracies—or perhaps against quasi-democracies”
(Forsythe 1993: 10). David concedes that mature, stable democracies may not make war
against each other (Forsythe 1993: 20–21).
Early in his career, David studied the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
and he continued his interest in that and other human rights nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) over the course of his career (for example, Forsythe 2005). From the ICRC in
Germany during WWII to Doctors without Borders now, there is a long-standing debate
about whether NGOs should provide assistance to victims of war or of human rights
violations, when to do so might strengthen their enemies or oppressors. Even the most
idealistic of interveners, David shows, may do more harm than good when they attempt to
help those who suffer gross abuses of their human rights.
David’s study of both humanitarian intervention and human rights has led him to the
awareness that peace and human rights are not identical concepts nor are they necessarily
coterminous; rather, the desire for peace may result in relegation of human rights to a
secondary goal. When I first started studying human rights in the late 1970s, I had not
thought about this problem, concerned as I was with the establishment of human rights
in newly independent countries of English-speaking Africa (Howard 1986). But then I
read David’s chapter on the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1983 to prevent genoci-
dal attacks against ethnic Tamils. India had to carefully back down from its defense of
the Tamils when it became apparent that support for possible secessionists in Sri Lanka
might embolden Sikh secessionists in India (Forsythe 1993: 94–96). Peace within India
took precedence over the human rights of some Indians’ coethnics in another sovereign
state.
At least on the normative front, there has been progress in international relations
regarding the protection of human rights. When David started writing in the field, there was
no discussion of what later became the responsibility to protect. By 2005, such responsibility
had been accepted, in principle, by the United Nations General Assembly. In 2011, when
the Arab Spring morphed into the Arab Winter of rebellion and repression in Libya, the
United Nations Security Council responded quickly, authorizing support to the Libyan
rebels. However, the responsibility to protect did not seem to extend to Bahrain, effectively
a protectorate of Saudi Arabia and far too close to that country for the United States, NATO,
or the UN to intervene. Nor, by mid-July 2012, had the responsibility to protect extended to
Syria, despite the Syrian government’s mass murder of thousands of people demonstrating
for a more democratic and rights-protective government.
At about the same time as NATO intervened in Libya, France intervened in Coˆte d’Ivoire
to enable the legally elected president, Alessane Ouattara, finally to take over power from
his predecessor, Laurent Gbagbo. In this latter case, the purpose was enforcement of the
democratic norm of formal elections. But whether enforcement of the results of elections
might protect the human rights of Ivoirians was not clear: Ethnically based electoral rivalry,
without a foundation of human rights, might leave Ivoirians worse off than they were under
the stable dictatorship of Fe´lix Houphouet-Boigny from 1961 to 1993.
In international relations, peace frequently trumps human rights, and David reminds
us that perhaps it should. In the expansionist version trumpeted by some activists, peace
is synonymous with all good things, including human rights. But in the real world, peace
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [W
ilf
rid
 L
au
rie
r U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
2:3
4 0
5 J
uly
 20
16
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is not-war, one very important good thing. If war—especially civil wars such as we have
seen in the last 40 years in countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Liberia, or Congo—is
the ultimate violator of all human rights, then compromises for peace may be ethically
justifiable. Thus, justice might have to give way to so-called “reconciliation”; that is,
to political deals that permit previously antagonistic factions to live in peace, even if
perpetrators of the grossest human rights violations are permitted to rejoin society without
atoning for their crimes. Mechanisms of transitional justice (TJ) may not be at all just but
may be necessary to preserve peace.
Nevertheless, David is skeptical of the contemporary movement to TJ. In the past,
he notes, justice did not extend to such criminals as Germany’s Wehrner von Braun and
Japan’s General Ishii, involved respectively during WWII in slave labor and biological
experimentation. Peace was more important than justice, especially when the victor could
use the talents of genocidal human rights abusers; transitions to democracy successfully
occurred without concern for justice. David also cautions us to be mindful of the structure
and context of each case of TJ, before assuming that particular mechanisms such as truth
commissions have particular results. In many cases, he argues, it will be at least a generation
before TJ mechanisms are implemented, and powerful countries such as the United States
and Russia may never implement any mechanisms to investigate such cruelties as the
mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib or massacres in Chechnya (Forsythe 2011a).
And then there are the exceptionally hard cases that are not amenable to any foreign
policy interventions to protect human rights. For example, North Korea is almost entirely
neglected in the human rights literature, though not by human rights NGOs, which issue
frequent reports on starvation, famine, and enforced slavery there (e.g., Hawk 2003). North
Korea is, or threatens to become, a nuclear power: The overarching goal of nuclear peace has
resulted in neglect in the international arena of the human rights of North Korea’s citizens.
Loose nukes trump human rights, as it were. Other interests are also at stake. South Korea
fears an overflow of refugees and the enormous costs of integrating the two countries should
the present regime in North Korea collapse. Both South Korea and the United States fear
attack by conventional weapons, as well as possible future nuclear attack. China, a friend to
North Korea, fears a much bigger influx of refugees in its northeastern region if the North
Korean regime is destabilized. Thus, the human rights of North Koreans take a very distant
second place to these threats both to international and to national stability.
These are the kinds of problems that David’s skepticism toward human rights and his
acknowledgement of the primacy of realpolitik first forced me to confront. As a pragmatic
liberal, David is willing to accept political realities even if they impinge on the liberal human
rights project, and even if it means sometimes jettisoning human rights in favor of other
goals such as diplomatic negotiations towards peace. Nevertheless, David stated in 2006
that he was “cautiously optimistic about a liberal world order in the long term” (Forsythe
2006: 6). Six years later, I hope that David retains the optimism he expressed then. His
cool, skeptical, restrained voice—both in person and in print—masks a deep commitment
to human rights. I am privileged to have been his colleague and friend for almost 25 years.
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